Officers Should Learn from Training. Agencies Should Learn About Their Officers from Training.
Not long ago, members of our training staff conducted Use of Force Options training for the agency we were working for at the time. We saw this not only as an opportunity to give all the commissioned members of our agency some quality training, but to give the agency itself some feedback and data on the use of force trends of our commissioned members.
How often does an agency learn from the training it provides to its personnel? If this cognitive approach was taken by more agencies, to more training, gaps in training could be identified. Training scars could be identified. Unintentional policy violations could be avoided and confusion about policy definition could be clarified. Once identified, the gaps could be traced back to their origin. Is it something the officers’ are being taught in the academy? From FTO’s? Is it a cultural thing exclusive to that particular agency? Have new and better methods of doing things been taught to the newer officers, which have them performing a task more safely or efficiently than the older officers who haven’t been exposed to that method?
Over the course of one month, 111 Sheriff’s Deputies participated in a series of live action scenario-based exercises. These scenarios including role players, Simunitions, inert pepper spray, Tasers (with no cartridge) and any other tools they would typically carry on duty.
For the Deputies’ benefit, the purpose of this training was threefold. First, to evaluate Deputies in their ability to make use of force-based decisions when given a certain set of circumstances. Second, to train them on how to employ the proper option for the given scenario. Finally, to refamiliarize Deputies with all their use of force options and to illustrate the importance of knowing your gear and tools and the best way to deploy them. For the agency’s benefit, the purpose of the training was to track and evaluate those use of force decisions, look for trends that could potentially reveal previously undetected training gaps and scars, and see how well policy translates to the street.
The execution of this training consisted of four scenario-based exercises. Each Deputy went through each scenario alone but had the option of requesting an assist or information on an assist was provided.
The breakdown of participants when grouped by years of service is as follows:
· 0-5 Years: 43
· 6-10 Years: 22
· 11-15 Years: 15
· 16-20 Years: 12
· 21-25 Years: 11
· 25+ Years: 8
SCENARIO 1: TRAFFIC STOP
Deputies were given a scenario where they have conducted a vehicle stop for a minor traffic violation. The driver was compliant initially and provided information, but was giving red flag statements such as “can you make it quick, I’m in a hurry” and “you’re not going to run my name, are you?”. When a computer check reveals an active warrant, the direction the scenario goes depends on whether the deputy asks for assist, waits for that assist if requested (the Deputy is advised the assist is 2-4 minutes away), or approaches the car to detain the suspect on his/her own. If the deputy approaches the car, the driver refuses to exit the vehicle and becomes verbally combative. Eventually the driver attempts to put the vehicle in drive and flee the scene. If the deputy waits for an assist to arrive before approaching the vehicle, the driver will exit the car and walk back toward the deputy aggressively which should result in the Deputy being required to make use of force decision.
· Points of evaluation for this scenario:
o Does the Deputy use a passenger side or driver side approach for the initial contact?
o Does the Deputy recognize the red flag statements?
o Does the Deputy call for an assist when he/she determines an arrest is to be made?
o If requested, does the Deputy wait for that assist before approaching the car again?
o Does the Deputy reach into the vehicle to either turn the car off or extract the suspect?
o Does the Deputy mace or tase the driver as he attempts to drive off?
o Does the Deputy use the appropriate Use of Force option if the suspect exits his car and comes toward the deputy aggressively?
· Results
o 39% of the Deputies utilized a passenger side approach for the initial contact.
§ Officers with 0-5 years of service- 51%
§ Officers with 6-10 years- 27%
§ Officers with 11-15 years- 27%
§ Officers with 16-20 years- 25%
§ Officers with 20+ years- 41%
§ Conclusion: The newer officers were more likely to conduct a passenger side approach. This is likely due to how things are being taught in the various police academies in the region currently as opposed to several years ago. While the debate on which approach is better will likely never be decided, we encourage and advocate for the passenger side approach.
o 36% of Deputies called for an assist once they determined an arrest should be made.
§ Officers with 0-5 years-62%
§ Officers with 6-10 years- 28%
§ Officers with 11-15 years- 22%
§ Officers with 16-20 years- 30%
§ Officers with 20+ years- 0%
Conclusions: Newer officers requested an assist at a far higher rate than officers with more time on. As far as the officers that did not request an assist, when asked why, we consistently got two answers: “I just never do” or “My assist is probably too far away”. It was clear this was a cultural issue within this agency that deputies are used to doing things alone. The agency covered a large county (over 700 square miles), and Deputies often had extended wait times for an assist. We re-enforced the importance of waiting for an assist and requested additional re-enforcement from the command structure to encourage deputies to ask for an assist when taking a subject into custody. Identifying this cultural issue was crucial, as the younger Deputies who were currently requesting assists, will likely gradually stop doing so as they progress in their careers as they fall victim to that culture.
o 26% of the Deputies that did call for an assist, did not wait for the assist to arrive before approaching the vehicle and attempting to take the driver into custody.
§ When a Deputy asked for an assist, they were told the assist was 2-4 minutes away. We felt this was a reasonable amount of time to wait for that assist to arrive before approaching a wanted felon. While they at least had an assist on the way, we feel the unwillingness to wait for it before re-engaging the driver was a result of the same cultural issue that prevented some Deputies from requesting an assist at all.
o If a deputy attempted to detain the suspect, our suspect role player refused to exit the vehicle, which was still running but in park. 44% of the deputies that attempted to detain the suspect reached into the vehicle to either turn the car off or physically extract the driver.
§ Officers with 0-5 years- 59%
§ Officers with 6-10 years- 54%
§ Officers with 11-15 years- 66%
§ Officers with 16-20 years- 10%
§ Officers with 20+ years- 25%
Conclusions: The dangers of reaching into a vehicle are obvious. The newer deputies were far more likely to reach into the car than the more experienced deputies. While this can be attributed to experience, agencies should continue to drive home the point to that reaching into a car that is still running should only be done in extreme circumstances, if at all. This training issue for this particular agency was traced back to the academy wherein officers were trained in different tactics for extracting combative subjects from vehicles. Interviews seemed to indicated older officers hadn’t been taught these tactics, or had abandoned using them after never receiving sustainment training in this area and not having confidence in their ability to do it safely.
o On four occasions, a deputy either tased or maced the suspect as he began to drive off. Corrective instruction was given to those deputies concerning the risks involved with potentially incapacitating the driver of a moving vehicle.
SCENARIO 2: FIGHT IN PROGRESS
Deputies were dispatched to a call for a “Fight in Progress”. Upon arrival, they observed two males in a physical altercation, approximately 50 feet away. When the deputy calls out to the males, one male complies and puts his hands in the air. The second male then punches the other male and then begins approaching the deputy aggressively with clenched fists while making verbal threats toward the deputy. At that point, the deputy has witnessed an assault and should be of the mindset that the suspect is going to be taken into custody. As the subject approaches with clenched fists and verbal threats, the deputy should employ a use of force option appropriate for the situation. If the deputy uses the Taser, he/she will be advised that the taser failed to have the desired effect and the deputy should transition to another appropriate option.
Multiple factors influenced the deputies’ choice of which tool to use. For example, many of the deputies would sprint toward the two males in conflict, thus reducing the reactionary gap and their time to make a use of force decision. Many times, when the male subject would turn his attention to the deputy, they would already be within a few feet of each other, thus, limiting the deputy’s options in terms of how to apply force. In most of these cases the deputy’s only option was to go hands on. 43% of our deputies attempted to use their taser first. This number was lower than expected, mindful of the aforementioned factors that forced deputies to use other options. Many deputies cited a lack of confidence in the taser’s effectiveness and well as indicated the type of clothing the suspect may have on would influence their use of force choice.
When reviewing the below data, please consider that the scenario called for the taser to fail. Thus, the other use of force options percentages includes those who chose that option second after the taser proved to be ineffective. The statistical breakdown is as follows:
· Taser 43%
· Mace 55%
· Baton 21%
· Empty Hand 15%
· Taser Drive Stun 7%
· Firearm 2%
The two deputies that deployed their firearm in this scenario were given corrective instruction as we feel the scenario did not call for the use of deadly force.
· Officers with 0-5 years on used their taser first 48% of the time.
· Officers with 6-10 years on used their taser first 32% if the time.
· Officers with 11-15 years on used their taser first 29% of the time.
· Officers with 16-20 years on used their taser first 33% of the time.
· Officers with 20+ years on used their taser first 18% of the time.
It became clear that newer officers relied more on and had more confidence in the effectiveness of the Taser than veteran officers. It is interesting to compare the taser usage to mace, which shows the opposite of the above. Veteran officers relied more on and had more confidence in using mace then the newer officers. Mace was used as a second option when the taser failed, or as a first option in the following pattern:
· 0-5 year Deputies used mace 43% of the time.
· 6-10 year Deputies used mace 68% of the time.
· 11-15 year Deputies used mace 29% of the time.
· 16-20 year Deputies used mace 58% of the time.
· 20+ year Deputies used mace 84% of the time.
Deputies running toward the fight, closing the ground quickly, thus limiting the amount of time they had to react to the suspect turning his aggression toward them, clearly was a factor in which tool was used and how it was used. Deputies demonstrated an over reliance on the taser and often had difficulty transitioning seamlessly to another option when the taser failed.
SCENARIO 3: KNIFE ATTACK
Deputies were given the same brief as Scenario 2. Once again, upon arrival the Deputy observes a physical altercation between two males approximately 50 feet away. This time, however, the main aggressor shoves the other male to the ground with that male exaggerating the fall and landing on the ground approximately 12-15 feet away from the suspect. The aggressor immediately pulls a large knife from the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt and aggressively approaches the defenseless male lying on the ground while verbally stating “I will kill you!” or something to that effect. The aggressor holds the knife high in the air to indicate the precursor of a stabbing motion.
The aggressor will continue to advance on the victim and proceed to stab him repeatedly if the Deputy does not intervene.
Points of evaluation for this scenario:
Does the deputy begin to “prep” a less lethal option when he initially arrives and observes only a physical altercation?
Does the deputy escalate and transition to a lethal force option when the aggressor produces a knife?
Does the deputy give verbal commands to the aggressor before applying a deadly force option?
Does the deputy wait too long to fire on the aggressor allowing him to reach the victim?
Can the deputy articulate the justification for the use of force option he/she chose?
The scenario was fairly cut and dry in terms of which use of force option should be employed. Our main goal was to see if the deputies would engage as such and be able to articulate why. The breakdown in percentages of Deputies using deadly force in this scenario were consistent through each test group. However, the total percentage of deputies using the deadly force appropriately was lower than we expected. The percentage of deputies using deadly force in this scenario is as follows:
0-5 years: 83%
6-10 years: 89%
11-15 years: 71%
16-20 years: 83%
20+ years: 84%
Instructors also noted when the Deputies waited too long to fire or didn’t fire at all. We deemed a deputy fell into the “waited too long” category if the deputy allowed the knife wielding aggressor to get to the point where he was able to stab the victim at least once before firing. We determined 19% of the deputies overall waited too long to engage the suspect with deadly force. On four occasions, the deputy took no action at all and the victim was stabbed repeatedly. Two deputies attempted to tase the suspect, which resulted in the taser not having the desired effect and the victim being stabbed. One Deputy attempted to mace the suspect and one Deputy deployed his expandable baton and attempted to rush the suspect.
23% of Deputies with 0-5 years on waited too long to use deadly force.
16% of Deputies with 6-10 years on waited too long to use deadly force.
14% of Deputies with 11-15 years on waited too long to use deadly force.
15% of Deputies with 16-20 years on waited too long to use deadly force.
15% of Deputies with 20+ years on waited too long to use deadly force.
We feel the percentage of deputies hesitating or not using the deadly force option in this scenario was too high. The current climate surrounding law enforcement using deadly force clearly is having an influence. And, as the numbers suggest, newer deputies are more influenced by that current environment. This identified a raining issue and we suggested more training involving shoot/don’t shoot scenarios for the agency. While most all of the deputies could cite the specific issue of using deadly force in the defense of others, still 19% were slow to do so.
The Deputies that waited too long or didn’t act at all were given corrective instruction by the training facilitators.
SCENARIO 4: SUSPICIOUS PERSON
Deputies are given a scenario involving a suspicious person loitering on a gas station lot. Deputies are told the suspect has been walking on the lot for the last hour asking patrons for money and/or a ride. When patrons decline, the suspect gets verbally aggressive. The gas station attendant approached the suspect asking him to leave; however, the suspect became verbally aggressive. The gas station attendant has since called 911 asking for the suspect to be removed from the property.
Upon arrival, Deputies will observe the subject for which they’ve been given a description. The subject is wearing a hooded sweatshirt and pacing on the lot. The subject has both hands in the pocket of the hooded sweatshirt and will not remove them when directed to do so by the Deputy. The subject will be verbally belligerent and not comply with any requests made by the Deputy, specifically, the request to show his hands. As the scenario progresses, the subject will continually attempt to close the gap between himself and the Deputy. After a brief time, the subject will quickly and aggressively produce a cell phone in his right hand and point it directly at the Deputy as though he is recording the incident on his cell phone camera. His left hand will remain in the pocket of the hooded sweatshirt. Upon command, the subject will show his other to the deputy. The subject will eventually be taken into custody by means decided upon by the Deputy.
Points of evaluation for this scenario:
Does the Deputy immediately recognize and address the obvious threat of the subject not showing his hands?
Does the Deputy give clear and concise commands to subject to remove his hands?
Does the Deputy begin to prep the appropriate use of force tool when the subject refuses to show his hands?
Does the Deputy recognize the item pulled from the hoodie is a cell phone and not a weapon?
Does the deputy de-escalate in his/her use of force option when the subject finally produces both hands?
Does the Deputy ultimately use the appropriate use of force option to take the subject into custody?
Can the Deputy articulate what their agency’s policy is regarding pulling his/her weapon during an incident?
The agency’s policy states, “Officers are not to remove a firearm from a holster or secured location or display a weapon unless there is sufficient articulable justification.” A vast majority of the Deputies were familiar with this policy; however, many could not translate the policy to the context of this scenario. For example, many deputies cited they were not within policy to “point a gun at a guy for trespassing”. The instructors reminded those deputies that the unholstering of the firearm had nothing to do with the trespassing issue, the unholstering was in response to the subject acting erratically and refusing commands to show his hands and the potential presence of a lethal weapon in his pocket. The use of force option is not based on the crime being investigated, but the level of non-compliance being exhibited. Here, we identified an instance where deputies did not understand how the policy should be applied to the context of this and similar scenarios.
For evaluation purposes of this scenario, Deputies were categorized by whether they had their hand on their pistol, drew the pistol to the low ready position, drew the pistol to the high ready position, or employed some other use of force tool option, such as the taser, mace, or they remained in an “interview position” utilizing no tool prior to the suspect producing the cell phone. When the subject eventually complies and shows both hands, Deputies were then evaluated on how well they de-escalated in terms of their use of force tool option. Meaning, once both hands were in view and no weapon was present, Deputies should have holstered their gun and gone for a less lethal option if the subject continued to be resistant. As a result, the numbers below reflect the actions of the Deputies during the encounter up to the point the suspect aggressively produced a cell phone with his right hand from the pocket:
Years 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 20+
Hands on Pistol, Did Not Draw 33% 53% 36% 25% 25%
Pistol Drawn, Low Ready 21% 26% 21% 25% 13%
Pistol Drawn, High Ready 5% 11% 0% 17% 25%
Taser 26% 0% 14% 8% 0%
Mace 2% 5% 7% 0% 13%
Baton 0% 0% 7% 0% 0%
Empty Hand/Interview Stance 12% 5% 14% 25% 25%
Overall statistics:
35% put their hand on their pistol but did not draw.
20% unholstered to a low ready position.
8% unholstered to a high ready position.
14% unholstered their taser.
6% unholstered their mace.
1% deployed a baton.
15% prepped no tool and maintained an interview position.
It could be argued only 63% of the deputies put themselves into a position to meet a deadly force encounter with a lethal option. The argument whether that is an appropriate response will be left to you, the reader.
The suspect was, however, shot by the deputy 6% of the time when he aggressively produced the cell phone from his hoodie pocket. Of those instances where the suspect was shot, 83% of the shootings occurred when the deputy was already at the high ready position. Of all the deputies that drew their firearm and went to the high ready position, 75% resulted in the suspect being shot. The suspect was shot 5% of the time when the deputy drew his firearm to a low ready position. Overall, the suspect was shot 21% of the time when the deputy unholstered his weapon prior to the cell phone being produced.
Instructors noted that the unholstering and drawing of the firearm increased the likelihood of the suspect being shot. The counter argument to that is, however, in every instance where a deputy did not unholster his/her sidearm, the deputy clearly would not have gotten it out in time if the suspect had produced a weapon instead on a cell phone.
While not an issue with this particular agency, we have encountered some instances where officers have expressed a hesitancy to draw weapons, either a firearm or taser, due to the fact that an informational or some other type of report is required when doing so
In the current environment where such instances fall under such scrutiny and are often captured on video, we feel documenting each occurrence when a Deputy draws his or her weapon protects both the Deputy and the agency. We anticipate the counter argument that requiring a report will make deputies hesitant to draw their weapon thus potentially endangering them in such an encounter. We feel this could be mitigated by the policy specifically stating the report should be brief and to the point. A two-paragraph narrative should not be enough for deputies or officers to allow their safety to be compromised. It should be stressed to them that such an informational report will be of little inconvenience and not be used against them in any way in regard to future use of force incidents. It could however be a way to track which deputies may have use of force concerns.
Agencies must strive to better understand what their training is telling them. In many agencies, the leaders, decision makers, and policy writers are not attending training with their officers or analyzing what their officers are getting from the training. As long as that particular training box is getting checked, all is well.
Checked boxes, cookie cutter training, and uninformative training is not the measuring stick anymore. Some agencies need to stop being lazy when it comes to training.
